Baitullah Mehsud, Public Enemy No 1, scourge of the security establishment and commander of what seemed to be an endless supply of suicide bombers, may finally be no more.
If he is indeed dead — and many credible sources have independently suggested that he is in fact dead — then a devastating blow has been struck right at the heart of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, the umbrella group of militant networks formed under Mehsud’s command in December 2007.
Several factors combined to make Mehsud an extraordinary threat to Pakistan: his de facto kingdom in South Waziristan gave him a phenomenal base in which to organise his militia, estimated to be in the thousands; his charismatic leadership made him a larger-than-life figure in the pantheon of militant leaders in Pakistan; and he rabidly, in many ways unprecedentedly, opposed the Pakistani state, which he accused of collaborating with Americans against the country’s interests.
Welcome as Mehsud’s elimination may be, it urgently raises several issues. First, the country will be bracing itself for retaliatory strikes and the security forces must be on the highest possible alert to thwart a wave of suicide bombings and fidayeen attacks.
Second, the country’s leadership must immediately determine whether now is the time to forcefully strike Mehsud’s base in South Waziristan. Without a doubt the Mehsud network will be in some disarray and uncertainty will have spread through its ranks; however, history suggests that militant groups quickly find a new leader to fill the void. Baitullah Mehsud himself stepped up after Abdullah Mehsud was found dead in a raid in Zhob, Balochistan in July 2007 and rapidly took that group to new heights of terror. This time though there are some important differences. Following military operations in Bajaur, Mohmand and Swat, the TTP is decidedly on the back foot. The state must assess whether an immediate full-fledged operation in the Waziristan agencies will degrade a demoralised TTP to the point that revival will be all but impossible.
The terror and tumult of the last several years should be a reminder to everyone involved of how quickly the militants can escalate their activities to dangerously destabilising levels.
Finally, the much-criticised drone strikes need to be reassessed in the light of recent events. Ever since the last months of the Bush presidency, the escalation of American drone strikes in Fata have been met with a firestorm of criticism in Pakistan. But, as the Mehsud case illustrates, healthy cooperation between the Americans and Pakistanis can actually benefit us in the fight against militancy.
If he is indeed dead — and many credible sources have independently suggested that he is in fact dead — then a devastating blow has been struck right at the heart of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, the umbrella group of militant networks formed under Mehsud’s command in December 2007.
Several factors combined to make Mehsud an extraordinary threat to Pakistan: his de facto kingdom in South Waziristan gave him a phenomenal base in which to organise his militia, estimated to be in the thousands; his charismatic leadership made him a larger-than-life figure in the pantheon of militant leaders in Pakistan; and he rabidly, in many ways unprecedentedly, opposed the Pakistani state, which he accused of collaborating with Americans against the country’s interests.
Welcome as Mehsud’s elimination may be, it urgently raises several issues. First, the country will be bracing itself for retaliatory strikes and the security forces must be on the highest possible alert to thwart a wave of suicide bombings and fidayeen attacks.
Second, the country’s leadership must immediately determine whether now is the time to forcefully strike Mehsud’s base in South Waziristan. Without a doubt the Mehsud network will be in some disarray and uncertainty will have spread through its ranks; however, history suggests that militant groups quickly find a new leader to fill the void. Baitullah Mehsud himself stepped up after Abdullah Mehsud was found dead in a raid in Zhob, Balochistan in July 2007 and rapidly took that group to new heights of terror. This time though there are some important differences. Following military operations in Bajaur, Mohmand and Swat, the TTP is decidedly on the back foot. The state must assess whether an immediate full-fledged operation in the Waziristan agencies will degrade a demoralised TTP to the point that revival will be all but impossible.
The terror and tumult of the last several years should be a reminder to everyone involved of how quickly the militants can escalate their activities to dangerously destabilising levels.
Finally, the much-criticised drone strikes need to be reassessed in the light of recent events. Ever since the last months of the Bush presidency, the escalation of American drone strikes in Fata have been met with a firestorm of criticism in Pakistan. But, as the Mehsud case illustrates, healthy cooperation between the Americans and Pakistanis can actually benefit us in the fight against militancy.
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